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OSINT: When public information becomes a weapon – Haezreena Begum Abdul Hamid

The growing use of open-source intelligence raises serious concerns over privacy, digital vigilantism, criminal exploitation and national security, highlighting the need for stronger safeguards and accountability

9:00 PM MYT

 

OPEN-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT) is increasingly celebrated as a powerful tool in modern
intelligence gathering, criminal investigations and national security. With information readily available through social media, websites, digital platforms, public records, satellite imagery and online databases, individuals and organisations can now collect, analyse and interpret information without necessarily having access to classified intelligence or sophisticated investigative capabilities.

On the surface, this appears to be a positive development. It democratises intelligence gathering, strengthens investigative capabilities and allows information to be accessed beyond traditional institutional boundaries. However, we need to be much more critical about this growing phenomenon. The fact that information is publicly available does not automatically make its collection, analysis, use or dissemination legitimate. There is a dangerous assumption that anything found on the internet is fair game simply because it is accessible to the public.

The real danger of OSINT is not merely the availability of information, but the ability to connect seemingly unrelated pieces of information and turn them into so-called intelligence that can expose individuals, compromise security, facilitate criminal activities and potentially cause serious harm.

Consider how much information individuals leave behind through their everyday digital
activities. A photograph uploaded on social media, a location tagged during a holiday, a comment made on a public platform, a workplace profile or even interactions with friends and family can reveal far more than the individual originally intended. Individually, these details may appear insignificant. However, when aggregated and analysed, they can expose someone’s identity, movements, relationships, daily routines and vulnerabilities.

This raises an important question: do individuals genuinely understand how much information about themselves can be reconstructed from their digital footprints? In criminological terms, we are looking at an environment where information originally intended for social interaction can be repurposed for surveillance, exploitation and victimisation. The consequences may include stalking, doxxing, harassment, identity theft, intimidation and even physical harm. We need to stop equating accessibility with consent.

What makes this even more concerning is that OSINT is not exclusively available to law enforcement agencies, intelligence organisations or government offices. Criminals have access to precisely the same information. Organised crime groups, scammers, traffickers, hackers and other offenders can exploit publicly accessible information to identify potential victims, understand their vulnerabilities and construct convincing approaches to manipulate them. Information about someone’s employment, family circumstances, financial activities and social connections can be used to facilitate impersonation, social engineering and targeted fraud.

We should not underestimate the implications of this. Criminal activities do not always require sophisticated hacking capabilities. Sometimes, all that is required is the ability to gather information about a potential victim and understand how to exploit it. In the context of online scams and transnational organised crime, publicly available information can become a valuable resource for criminal networks. The same information that assists law enforcement in identifying criminals can also assist criminals in identifying their victims. This is the paradox of OSINT that deserves greater attention.

Another worrying development is the growing practice of individuals and online communities conducting their own investigations using OSINT and subsequently publishing their findings on social media. While some may argue that these activities promote accountability and expose wrongdoing, we need to question where legitimate public scrutiny ends and digital vigilantism begins.

There is a fundamental difference between identifying a potential lead and establishing that
someone has committed a criminal offence. A photograph, social media account, geolocation record or online interaction does not, on its own, establish criminal liability. Yet, individuals are increasingly identified, accused and publicly condemned based on information gathered and interpreted by people who may have neither investigative training nor access to the full facts.

Once an allegation goes viral, the damage can be irreversible. Personal details may be exposed, family members dragged into public scrutiny, employment affected and individuals subjected to threats and harassment. The internet often delivers punishment before due process. We cannot allow the democratisation of intelligence gathering to become the democratisation of punishment. OSINT findings are intelligence leads that require verification, not substitutes for proper investigations, evidential standards or judicial determination. The presumption of innocence should not become optional simply because an accusation is supported by information circulating online.

From a national security perspective, the implications are equally serious. Information relating to military installations, critical infrastructure, government facilities, security personnel and operational movements may be available through photographs, satellite imagery and social media activity. When systematically analysed, these seemingly ordinary pieces of information can reveal security vulnerabilities, patterns of movement and potential targets. Hostile actors, terrorist organisations and extremist networks can exploit such information for reconnaissance, target identification, propaganda and operational planning.

What makes this particularly concerning is that individuals sharing such information may not
even realise that they are exposing sensitive details. Intelligence gathering is no longer confined to traditional state actors. Non-state actors have increasingly sophisticated capabilities to collect and interpret publicly available information. The distinction between what is public and what is operationally sensitive is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.

The emergence of artificial intelligence makes the situation even more complicated. AI can
accelerate the collection, processing, correlation and analysis of enormous volumes of
publicly accessible information. It can identify patterns, connect individuals to particular
networks and generate profiles based on fragmented digital traces. However, speed and
analytical capability should never be confused with accuracy.

Images can be manipulated, videos taken out of context, accounts falsely attributed and digital identities misrepresented. AI-generated content further complicates the verification process. The danger is not simply that false information may be circulated, but that false information can be presented in a convincing analytical format, giving it an appearance of credibility that it does not deserve. We must question whether investigators and decision-makers are becoming overly dependent on technological outputs without sufficiently examining the reliability, provenance and context of the information being analysed.

Perhaps the most important issue is accountability. Who regulates and holds OSINT practitioners accountable? When law enforcement agencies collect intelligence, their activities should operate within applicable legal and institutional safeguards. But what happens when private individuals, commercial entities or online groups undertake similar activities? What limits their ability to collect, analyse, profile and disseminate personal information? What recourse does an individual have when wrongly identified, exposed or targeted? And who assumes responsibility when information gathered through OSINT
contributes to harassment, reputational damage or physical harm?

These are not merely technological questions. They are questions of law, human rights, privacy and institutional accountability. In Malaysia, these concerns deserve greater attention as digital investigations and intelligence gathering become increasingly important in law enforcement and national security.

Our existing legal frameworks must be examined in the context of how personal information is collected, processed, disclosed and potentially misused. We should not allow the language of intelligence, transparency or public interest to become a convenient justification for intrusive practices without proper accountability.

This does not in any way suggest that OSINT should be discouraged. Its value in modern criminal investigations, intelligence gathering and threat assessment is undeniable.

However, its usefulness should not exempt it from scrutiny. There must be greater emphasis
on the legality, necessity and proportionality of information gathering, the reliability of sources, verification of findings and accountability for the consequences of their use. Law enforcement agencies must also maintain a clear distinction between intelligence and evidence. Intelligence may provide investigative direction, but it must still be tested, corroborated and assessed in accordance with applicable evidential requirements.

Ultimately, OSINT is neither inherently good nor inherently bad. Its implications depend on
who uses it, for what purpose, under what authority and with what safeguards. The real concern is that we are becoming increasingly comfortable with the idea that anything publicly accessible can be collected, analysed and used without questioning the consequences.

In our enthusiasm to embrace intelligence-led investigations and technological advancement, we may be creating an environment where privacy is progressively eroded, individuals become vulnerable to digital victimisation and unaccountable actors acquire the power to investigate, expose and effectively punish others.

Public information does not mean information without consequences. The ability to access
information should never be confused with the right to exploit it. Perhaps the more important
question is not how much intelligence we can gather through OSINT, but how much harm we
may be creating in the process. – November 17, 2026

***Dr Haezreena Begum Abdul Hamid is a criminologist and senior lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Universiti Malaya.

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